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Abstract
In 2015, for the first time in 16 years, Kuwait reported a fiscal deficit of  2.71 billion 
Kuwaiti Dinars ($9.4 billion). The deficit was exacerbated by weakness in crude prices and 
mounting supply–demand imbalances in the global oil market. It is critical that Kuwait 
reacts with a fiscal contingency plan to avoid the uncertainties and volatility of  depending 
primarily on oil to fund government activities. This paper aims to highlight the current 
economic condition and fiscal needs of  Kuwait, as well as to propose a set of  potential 
mitigating strategies for the government to consider.
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Introduction
Whether Kuwait can retain sovereignty if  oil reserves are depleted is a question often 
debated. While Kuwait has the financial power to maintain government spending for 
a considerable period, it may not be sustainable in the longer term. The government 
remains heavily dependent on oil exports, having failed to build an entrepreneurial system 
that can alleviate the burden of  demographic drag on the fiscal budget. Oil exports com-
prise 59 percent of  gross domestic product (GDP).1 Due to the recent plunge in oil prices, 
Kuwait’s GDP growth rate dropped from 2.3 percent in 2013 to an estimated 1.8 percent 
in 2015. Such a drastic change illustrates the degree to which Kuwait’s income is affected 
by the inherent volatility in commodity markets. Other potential challenges to the Kuwaiti 
economy include geopolitical instability, the threat of  clean and renewable energy, the 
scarcity of  oil, and new oil producers entering the market and being likely to drive down 
prices. The stronger the country’s fiscal position, the better it will be at absorbing political 
and economic shocks.
Therefore, the goal of  this paper is to propose a set of  fiscal reform strategies that are 
feasible in the short, medium and long term, even in the absence of  substantial resource 
diversification. Relevant statistics and literature are reviewed to analyse Kuwait’s econ-
omy and the potential impact of  the fiscal reform strategies proposed, with the motivation 
of  providing guidance to policymakers about feasible options to manage Kuwait’s fiscal 
deficit. The paper highlights selected potential mitigating strategies for the government to 
consider but does not provide guidance on the optimal set of  fiscal reforms or the order 
in which they should be implemented. The optimal set of  reforms requires thorough 
scrutiny which depends on, among other factors, preferences for the role of  Kuwait’s gov-
ernment and the economic, political and distributional costs of  reforms involved.
This paper provides an overview of  Kuwait’s economy in addition to current and past 
fiscal budget positions, and highlights the structure of  its oil reserves as well as investments 
and strategies to minimise the deficit driven by low oil prices. An approach is proposed 
to calculate the Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA)’s assets and introduce new data on 
foreign aid.
The first section discusses Kuwait’s economy and the characteristics of  national revenues; 
the second section explains the structure of  government reserve funds. The third section 
proposes a set of  mitigating strategies, which includes issuing sovereign bonds, finding a 
new optimal level for foreign aid, reforming subsidies, introducing taxation and increas-
ing fees, devaluing the Kuwaiti dinar and restructuring expatriates’ benefits. The fourth 
section concludes and recaps recommendations.
1  Abbreviations and acronyms that are used more than once in the paper are listed in Appendix E.
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An Overview of Kuwait’s Economy and Fiscal Position
Kuwait’s Revenues
Traditional trade theory indicates that a country’s welfare is maximised when it specialises 
in goods that it can produce relatively cheaply. In 1946, the state of  Kuwait exported its first 
crude oil shipment and since then it has been heavily dependent on oil revenues. From 2004 
to 2014, oil exports comprised almost 90 percent of  revenues, with residual contributions 
from fees/fines, taxes on international companies and service revenues (see Figure 1).
Figure 1. Kuwaiti Government Revenues, 2004–14 
Source: Ministry of Finance, Kuwait.
Oil production stood at 2.7 million barrels per day (mb/d) in July 2015, and the govern-
ment has ambitious production targets for the future. Kuwait Petroleum Corporation 
(KPC) is targeting 3.15 mb/d by the end of  2015 and 3.65 mb/d by the end of  2020. 
Such an increase is feasible, considering that Kuwait holds the world’s sixth largest oil 
reserves, the equivalent of  104.5 billion barrels according to US Energy Information 
Administration figures. If  production of  4 mb/d is assumed, current reserves would be 
depleted in 70 years.
Diversification could boost national revenues. In fact, practitioners and academics often 
refer to it as one of  the primary mechanisms to foster economic growth. For instance, 
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Papageorgiou and Spatafora,2 as well as Lederman and Maloney,3 document an associa-
tion between diversification and economic growth. Kuwait’s government is aware of  such 
correlations but has not been successful in adopting or implementing efficient diversifica-
tion; as already noted, oil contributes almost 90 percent of  public revenues. To support 
this point further, Figure 2 maps the International Monetary Fund (IMF)’s export diver-
sification index over the period 1962 to 2010. From 2000 onward, Kuwait is ranked the 
lowest among eight oil-exporting countries.
Figure 2. Export Diversification Index, 1962–2010
Source: IMF Export Diversification and Quality Databases. 
Note: High values indicate low ranking. 
Aside from establishing a Sovereign Wealth Fund in the 1950s, economic growth in Kuwait 
was mainly driven by oil and imported labour and not by substantial manufacturing/pri-
vate sector activities. The sovereign wealth story began in 1953 when the ruler of  Kuwait, 
Abdullah Al-Salim Al-Sabah, established the Kuwait Investment Office (KIO), which was 
brought under the umbrella of  the KIA in 1983. The government wanted to establish a stable 
2  Chris Papageorgiou and Nikola Spatafora, ‘Economic Diversification in LICs: Stylized Facts and 
Macroeconomic Implications’, IMF Staff  Discussion Note 12/13 (Washington, DC: International Mon-
etary Fund, 2012).
3  Daniel Lederman and William F. Maloney, Does What You Export Matter? In Search of  Empirical Guidance 
for Industrial Policies (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2012).
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source of  funds which could support future generations when oil reserves become depleted 
or insufficient. Thereafter and until 2010, the government of  Kuwait did not adopt effi-
cient policies to stimulate a major non-oil sector’s economic growth as a means to support 
government spending. Why is this the case?
A number of  studies show that resource-rich countries grow more slowly when compared 
to resource-deficient countries,4 a phenomenon called ‘the resource curse’.5 The phenom-
enon exists in countries with plentiful national resources even after controlling for climate 
and geography.6 Additionally, in an effort to explain the factors behind the curse, Mehlum, 
Moene and Torvik7 show that the resource curse phenomenon is attributed to the differ-
ences in the quality of  institutions. On the one hand, a wealth of  natural resources (oil in 
Kuwait’s case) pushes aggregate income down when institutions allow entrepreneurs to 
seek rent without incentivising new wealth creation; on the other hand, resource wealth 
raises income when institutions encourage entrepreneurs to pursue growth-driven activi-
ties, making it producer friendly. Another study highlights the deficiencies of  institutions 
particularly in Kuwait;8 the study argues that some government rent distribution policies 
resulted in substantial distortions, inefficiencies and institutional deficiencies there. The 
authors list eight channels through which the Kuwaiti government distributes rents: public 
investment in infrastructure, land purchases, public transfer payments and pensions, subsi-
dies, government employment, intervention in the private sector, the regulation of  Kuwait’s 
foreign direct investment environment, and investment abroad.
Although the underdevelopment of  institutions could explain the curse in Kuwait at least 
to a certain extent, further empirical research is required to verify that this is indeed the 
case. Other barriers to diversification include: growth scenarios for the world economy, 
the duplication of  economic activities among the Gulf  Cooperation Council (GCC) states, 
the sizeable barriers to interregional trade, weaknesses that the GCC regimes exhibited 
under the stress of  the Arab Spring, and governments’ abandonment of  their plans.9 
Addressing these barriers will foster more efficient diversification, but this is a slow pro-
cess and consequently may require a longer timeline for execution than the current fiscal 
balance sheet stress may allow.
4  Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew M. Warner, ‘Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth’, 
in Gerald M. Meier and James E. Rauch (eds), Leading Issues in Economic Development, 7th ed. (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000).
5  Richard M. Auty, Sustaining Development in Mineral Economies: The Resource Curse Thesis (London and New 
York: Routledge, 1993).
6  Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew M. Warner, ‘The Curse of  Natural Resources’, European Economic Review 
45/4–6 (2001), pp. 827–38.
7  Halvor Mehlum, Karl Moene and Ragnar Torvik, ‘Institutions and the Resource Curse’, Economic 
Journal 116 (2006), pp. 1–20.
8  Laura El-Katiri, Bassam Fattouh and Paul Segal, ‘Anatomy of  an Oil-Based Welfare State: Rent Dis-
tribution in Kuwait’, LSE Kuwait Programe Paper Series No. 13 (2011).
9  Martin Hvidt, ‘Economic Diversification in GCC Countries: Past Record and Future Trends’, LSE 
Kuwait Programe Paper Series No. 27 (2013).
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Regardless of  past obstacles to diversification, the government of  Kuwait is keen to expand 
the economy independent of  oil. Recent developments include launching a 25-year devel-
opment plan in 2010.10 This strategy includes privatisations and infrastructure projects 
worth billions of  dollars, all of  which are expected to foster development and contribute 
to GDP. Also in 2012, the government established a 2 billion Kuwaiti Dinars (KD) fund 
to support the development in Kuwait of  small and medium enterprises (SMEs). Research 
studies have emphasised the importance of  SMEs’ role in job creation and economic 
growth. For instance, Ayyagari, Demirgüç-Kunt and Beck11 provide evidence of  the con-
tribution of  the SME sector to total employment in manufacturing and GDP across 76 
countries. In a similar manner, Ayyagari, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic12 find that 
small firms globally have the largest share of  job creation and some of  the highest sales 
and employment growth, even after controlling for firm age. The government of  Kuwait is 
hopeful that the aforementioned mega-projects will help diversify resources, but complet-
ing these projects will take a long time, and the Ministry of  Finance is already wavering.
This paper argues unequivocally that efforts to foster diversification taken by Kuwait’s 
government have been limited and thus have failed to generate significant revenues which 
can support government spending over the long run – especially given the constant tur-
bulence in energy markets and the increasing burden of  demographic drag on the budget 
(discussed in more detail in the next subsection). The strategies recommended in the third 
section will strengthen the government’s fiscal position and foster growth even in the 
absence of  significant diversification.
An Overview of Kuwait’s Fiscal Budget
The inherent turbulence of  global energy markets poses major threats to the government 
of  Kuwait, which depends almost entirely on oil revenues. A considerable amount of 
wealth goes to national expenditures, with between 75 and 90 percent of  total expected 
revenues allocated to such spending, while the remainder is allocated to the KIA.
The State of  Kuwait’s national expenditures budget ranged between $18.4 billion and 
$68.3 billion over the period 2003/4–13/14 and is distributed over five chapters (see 
Figure 3). The first chapter covers salaries, wages and government employee benefits, 
which include travel and government contributions to the public pension fund. The 
second chapter covers goods and services. The third chapter covers transportation, equip-
ment and supplies, while the fourth covers construction projects and public acquisitions. 
Finally, the fifth chapter covers miscellaneous expenditure and transfer payments and 
includes any expenditure that cannot be accounted for under the other chapters.
10  ‘Kuwait’s Government Development Plan for the Years 2010–2014’, General Secretariat of  the Supreme 
Council of  Planning and Development, Ministry of  Planning. Available at http://www.mop.gov.kw/Final-Mid_
range_plan.pdf  (accessed 18 February 2016).
11  Meghana Ayyagari, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt and Thorsten Beck, ‘Small and Medium Enterprises Across 
the Globe’, Small Business Economics xxix/4 (2007), pp. 415–34.
12  Meghana Ayyagari, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt and Vojislav Maksimovic, ‘Small vs. Young Firms Across 
the World: Contribution to Employment, Job Creation, and Growth’, World Bank Policy Research Working 
Paper No. 5631 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2011).
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Figure 3. Kuwait Budget Expenditures by Chapter, 2003/4–13/14 ($ million)
Source: End-of-year reports by the Ministry of Finance, Kuwait. 
Note: For descriptions of the chapters shown here, see the main text. Exchange rate conversion is based on Central Bank of 
Kuwait reports. 
The fifth chapter also serves the country’s national security and foreign policy needs; 
Appendix A provides a breakdown of  the fifth-chapter categories. It can be seen that 
the majority of  the fifth-chapter expenditures is kept inside Kuwait: 53.5 percent of  the 
chapter is allocated to public authorities and organisations, 12.8 percent to the Ministry 
of  Defence and 8.5 percent to general subsidies.
In terms of  allocation of  expenditures, over the period 2003/4–13/14 on average, 25 
percent of  expenses was allocated to the first chapter, 16 percent to the second and 1 
percent to the third, while the fourth and fifth chapters consumed 9.8 percent and 48 
percent, respectively.
Current demographics indicate that the state wage bill is likely to grow substantially by 
2020. The total workforce in Kuwait at the end of  2013 was 2.37 million (see Table 1), of 
which 18.5 percent (see Table 2) work in the government sector – the equivalent of  441,007 
employees, including 310,602 Kuwaitis. The government has of  late attempted to nation-
alise the private sector workforce and terminate government contracts with expatriates. 
According to Kuwait’s constitution, the government is obliged to employ citizens; currently 
the average Kuwaiti employee’s monthly salary is KD1,600, equivalent to about $5,559, 
according to Ministry of  Finance (MOF) figures. Furthermore, the World Bank estimates 
that Kuwait’s population will grow at an annual rate of  3.6 percent to 2020. If  a similar 
growth rate is assumed in the public sector workforce, an aggregate government wage bill 
of  at least $25.62 billion can be expected by 2020 (note that this wage bill excludes expa-
triates working in the government sector and does not adjust for inflation). Given these 
assumptions for the first chapter of  the budget and holding the remaining chapter spend-
ing at 2013/14 levels, it is reasonable to assume that the total expenditures budget will be 
at least $75.90 billion by 2020 simply because of  Kuwait’s demographic profile.
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Table 1. Kuwaiti Workforce, 2011–13
Source: Public Authority for Civil Information, Kuwait. 
Nationality 2011 2012 2013
Kuwaiti 389,746 399,345 410,254
Percentage Kuwaiti 17% 17% 17%
Non-Kuwaiti 1,837,657 1,896,910 1,960,747
Percentage non-Kuwaiti 83% 83% 83%
Total Workforce 2,227,403 2,296,255 2,371,001
Table 2. Workforce Distribution by Sector, 2011–13 (in percentage)
Source: Public Authority for Civil Information, Kuwait. 
Workforce 2011 2012 2013
Government Sector 18.9 18.7 18.5
Kuwaiti 13.3 13.2 13.1
Non-Kuwaiti 5.6 5.5 5.5
Private Sector 53.6 54.7 55.5
Kuwaiti 3.6 3.6 3.8
Non-Kuwaiti 50 51.1 51.7
Family Sector 25.5 24.6 24.2
Kuwaiti 0 0 0
Non-Kuwaiti 25.5 24.6 24.2
Unemployed 2.1 2 1.8
Kuwaiti 0.6 0.5 0.5
Non-Kuwaiti 1.5 1.4 1.3
Total 100 100 100
Kuwaiti 17.5 17.4 17.3
Non-Kuwaiti 82.5 82.6 82.7
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As a result of  these simple estimates, an implied oil price of  approximately $69.84 is 
required for the budget to break even in 2020, assuming oil production remains at 2.7 
mb/d, and non-oil revenues remain at the 2013/14 level of  $7.08 billion. Note that pro-
duction could increase, however. Whether KPC will be successful in increasing production 
to 3.65 mb/d by 2020 is another widely debated and uncertain topic. If  targeted produc-
tion increases are indeed achieved, the required fiscal breakeven oil price per barrel will 
decline from $69.84 to $51.66 (see Appendix D for exchange rates).
An Overview of Kuwait’s Historical Fiscal Position
During the period 1990–9, the MOF consistently reported fiscal deficits, with the excep-
tion of  1996/7, which recorded a surplus of  KD63 million (see Figure 4). The Iraqi 
invasion in 1990 is partially responsible for the aforementioned period’s deficit. According 
to former public officials who chose to remain anonymous, Kuwait depleted 80 percent 
of  the Future Generations Fund (FGF) to rehabilitate its territory from the impact of 
the Gulf  War. Withdrawing FGF assets is prohibited by law (discussed in more detail 
in the next section), and as such, the transaction was recorded as a loan granted by the 
FGF to the General Reserve Fund (GRF); the loan was thereafter repaid in instalments 
during the 1990s. Note that the FGF and GRF are cornerstones of  Kuwait’s financial 
system and are effectively the national Sovereign Wealth Fund and the Central Bank’s 
current account, respectively. Also, in order to accelerate urbanisation after the war, the 
government commissioned many projects to the private sector under the umbrella of  the 
Build–Operate–Transfer (BOT) law, which is a form of  privatisation. Under the BOT 
framework, the private sector builds and operates a public project, usually for 25 years, 
after which time its ownership is transferred back to the government. During the 1990s 
and under the umbrella of  BOT, many commercial, shopping, entertainment and sport 
projects were completed. BOT infrastructure projects (water, electricity, roads) scarcely 
existed, with the exception of  Sulaibiya water station. 
To manage the 1998/9 deficit, the government reduced its capital expenditures/tenders 
– a move later widely perceived as imprudent. Thereafter Kuwait enjoyed a long run of 
fiscal surpluses until 2014/15, when the government reported a deficit of  $8.9 billion. By 
the same token, 2015/16 estimates point to an even larger deficit of  $27.5 billion, assum-
ing an oil price of  $45.
14 Treating the Oil Addiction in Kuwait: Proposals for Economic Reform
Figure 4. Actual Surplus/(Deficit), 1990–2015 (in KD)
Source: Ministry of Finance, Kuwait. 
Note: Please refer to Appendix D for exchange rates
Ongoing developments in global energy markets are indeed alarming, as increased supply 
is expected from Iran and possibly Libya and as demand has sustained sluggish growth at 
best. The IMF retained its trend of  downward revisions to its global growth forecasts for 
2015 (with a 4 percent forecast in January revised down to 3.3 percent in July). Concur-
rently, the Organization of  the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) has demonstrated 
no interest in cutting production. The confluence of  these factors contributed to Brent 
oil prices hitting a post-financial crisis low in January and August of  2015. The supply/
demand balance in global crude markets is currently loose, and oversupply could increase 
further given the aforementioned potential production sources combined with lacklustre 
demand. This scenario would most probably put additional pressure on oil prices and on 
the fiscal position of  Kuwait.
For Kuwait’s national revenues to meet or exceed expenses in the 2015/16 budget, oil 
prices must equal or exceed $55 per barrel assuming a daily production of  2.70 mb/d, 
an exchange rate of  $3.2 to KD1, and non-oil revenues of  $6.5 billion. In reality, Hashim 
Hashim, the CEO of  Kuwait Oil Company (KOC), has announced plans to boost pro-
duction by the end of  2015 to 3.15 mb/d and to 3.65 mb/d by the end of  2020. This 
target will be achieved through three main projects: the heavy oil project in the northern 
field of  Ratqa, three assembly centres in northern Kuwait, and buying 50 rigs to drill 
and maintain current wells. KOC is likely to face four key challenges in carrying forward 
with its plans: (1) opposition coming from the National Assembly; (2) disagreement with 
Saudi Arabia over the neutral production zone (Al Khafji and Wafra fields); (3) insufficient 
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initial budget allocations to KPC tenders, which convolutes and prolongs executing the 
expansion projects; and (4) potential OPEC refusal to adjust Kuwait’s production quota.
In this section, I have discussed the disappointing track record Kuwait has posted during 
the last 30–50 years in its effort to diversify the economy away from oil and sovereign 
investments. The government has failed to establish a saleable entrepreneurial system 
which could alleviate the burden of  demographic drag on state liabilities (i.e. wages). 
Given the uncertainties inherent in global oil supply and demand, as well as the uncertain-
ties in expanding local oil production, Kuwait could eventually face solvency problems. 
While it is true that Kuwait has tapped into the FGF reserve (once), this was during a state 
of  emergency (i.e. an unprovoked war). Under normal conditions this is not a prudent 
solution given other viable options. As such, I strongly believe that other fiscal reform 
strategies (discussed in the following sections) should be attempted prior to calling for 
tapping FGF assets. The next section discusses in more detail the structure of  government 
reserves, their financial characteristics and their ability to support government spending.
The Structure of Government Reserves
Before the mitigating strategies can be fully highlighted in the next section, it is necessary 
to explain the structure of  government reserve funds and try to estimate KIA assets, as 
these funds are the equivalent of  Kuwait’s current and savings accounts. The State of 
Kuwait allocates reserves to two major government funds: the GRF and the FGF. The 
GRF receives all government revenues and pays all national expenditures (i.e. it acts like 
a current account). The GRF also holds government assets, including Kuwait’s participa-
tion in public enterprises such as the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development and 
KPC, as well as Kuwait’s participation in multilateral and international organisations such 
as the World Bank, the IMF and the Arab Fund. The FGF was established in 1976 under 
Law Number 106, which states that 10 percent shall be deducted from annual revenues 
and transferred to the FGF for the purpose of  supporting future generations. Also, no 
assets are to be withdrawn from the FGF unless sanctioned by law, which is partially why 
I propose the mitigating strategies in the next section. The KIA manages the surpluses of 
the GRF and all FGF assets. KIA financial statements are not public documents, how-
ever. They are made available annually to the Council of  Ministers and to the State Audit 
Bureau (which reports to the National Assembly). The only semi-official estimate of  FGF 
assets was made publicly available by the newspaper Al-Qabas, which cited a State Audit 
Bureau report for the year 2011–12. In the report, FGF assets were shown as KD75.3 
billion ($270 billion) on 31 March 2012. Table 3 lists the actual annual allocations by the 
government of  Kuwait to the FGF and the GRF. Table 3 also contains my estimates of 
expected total allocations to the KIA over the period 2003–14.
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Table 3. Total Expected Allocation to KIA, 2003–14 (KD)
Source: Actual numbers were obtained from the Ministry of Finance’s end-of-year records, excluding actual allocations to FGF and 
GRF for the period 2003–5, which were calculated manually.  
Year Actual  
Revenues 
Actual 
Expenses
Actual Alloca-
tion to FGF
Actual Alloca-
tion to GRF 
Expected Allo-
cation to KIA
2003–4 6,937,264,230 5,522,814,806 693,726,423 720,723,001 693,726,423
2004–5 8,962,370,731 6,315,216,598 896,237,073 1,750,917,060 896,237,073
2005–6 13,728,108,218 6,861,977,838 1,372,810,821 5,493,319,559 6,866,130,380
2006–7 15,509,262,505 10,306,377,533 1,550,926,250 3,651,958,721 5,202,884,971
2007–8 19,022,622,528 9,698,018,470 1,902,262,252 7,422,341,804 9,324,604,056
2008–9 21,005,800,240 18,262,198,464 2,100,580,024 643,021,751 2,743,601,775
2009–10 17,687,937,563 11,250,709,963 1,768,793,756 4,668,433,844 6,437,227,600
2010–11 21,501,984,649 16,221,001,904 2,150,198,464 3,130,784,279 5,280,982,743
2011–12 30,236,086,614 17,007,429,079 3,023,608,661 10,205,048,873 13,228,657,534
2012–13 32,008,542,620 19,307,556,125 8,002,135,655 4,698,850,839 12,700,986,494
2013–14 31,811,422,456 18,903,305,806 7,952,855,614 4,955,261,036 12,908,116,650
Total 218,411,402,354 139,656,606,586 31,414,134,993 44,869,020,706 76,283,155,699
Notes: The Kuwaiti government financial year starts on 1 April and ends on 31 March. The percentage allocation of actual revenues 
to the FGF increased in 2012 from 10 to 25 percent and was reduced back to 10 percent in the 2015/16 budget. Allocation to GRF 
= Actual revenues - Actual expenses - Other Allowances. Expected Allocation to KIA = Actual Allocation to GRF + Actual Allocation 
to FGF. Please refer to Appendix D for exchange rates.  
KIA does not disclose the strategy or the location of  investments, making it difficult to 
ascertain the historical rate of  return. In an interview with the newspaper Al-Rai on 12 
October 2014, the Kuwait minister of  finance, Anas Al-Saleh, disclosed the rate of  return 
KIA earned annually during the previous 20 years.13 Over the preceding 5, 10 and 20 years, 
KIA grossed a rate of  return of  12.1 percent, 7.6 percent and 8.6 percent, respectively.
On the basis of  these official average rates of  returns, KIA total assets are calculated on 
the following set of  assumptions:
1. A rate of  return of  12.1 percent was employed to calculate the FGF fund assets over 
the last two years.
2. A rate of  return of  7.6 percent was employed to calculate the GRF fund assets over 
the last ten years.
13  Abada Ahmed and Redha AlSinary, ‘Al-Saleh: The Strategic Alterative Will Improve More than Half 
the Public Employees Status’, AlRai Newspaper, 12 October 2014. Available at http://www.alraimedia.
com/UI/PDF.aspx?i=12886&p=36 (accessed 19 February 2016).
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3. The balance of  the FGF assets at the end of  2011/12 was KD75.3 billion, according 
to State Audit Bureau reports).
4. The Ministry of  Finance allocations were as reported in Table 3.
5. The exchange rate (Kuwaiti dinar/US dollar) was that of  the official Central Bank of 
Kuwait (CBK).
Total KIA assets were estimated as ranging between KD159 billion and KD176 billion, 
the equivalent of  $530 billion and $626 billion as of  31 March 2014. The lower limit of 
this range excludes interest earned on the GRF.
KIA investment revenues are not reported in the fiscal budget. If  investment revenues 
(i.e. interest and capital appreciation) were reported, an additional KD18.4 billion ($61.4 
billion) would feed into the 2015/16 budget, which should be sufficient to cover almost 
95 percent of  expenses. However, this is not sustainable and, more importantly, the gov-
ernment is prohibited from using FGF assets unless otherwise indicated by a new law. 
The GRF assets, however, could be used to fund shortfalls, although this is also a widely 
debated topic domestically. If  the government moved to tap into the GRF, assets would 
be completely depleted in approximately five years (assuming the deficit remains KD8.9 
billion and a GRF balance at the 2014/15 year-end is KD42.2 billion). Depleting either 
fund’s assets would result in the KIA forgoing an annual rate of  return ranging from 
7.6 percent to 12.1 percent. Any loss of  foreign investment returns would actually make 
Kuwait’s position less diverse and less solvent, given these foreign returns come from var-
ious geographies, sectors and asset classes. For this reason, I examine other alternatives. 
I have, however, presented this section to provide context as to the social and political 
challenges and pressures the government is likely to face when deciding not to tap FGF or 
GRF assets. In other words, Kuwait has obvious options for mitigating the deficit in the 
short term (i.e. the next five years) and is likely to be under pressure from less financially 
savvy citizens to take ‘the easy way out’. In the medium and long term, however, this easy 
option reduces Kuwait’s future flexibility and safety net. As such, a different set of  strate-
gies, described in the next section, is preferable at this juncture in Kuwait’s fiscal history.
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Mitigating Strategies
As highlighted in the first section, Kuwait is expecting another fiscal deficit in 2015/16 due 
to volatility in the oil market and weak diversification in the local non-oil export sector. In 
the previous section, Kuwait has been shown as having significant general reserves man-
aged in the GRF and FGF, some of  whose assets could be used to plug expected fiscal 
deficits. Nonetheless, these funds will not sustain government spending over the longer 
term, especially given the demographic drag highlighted in the first section. Therefore, 
this section proposes core mitigating strategies suitable for Kuwait. Each of  the six sections 
below provides an overview of  the advantages and disadvantages of  one potential strategy.
Sovereign Debt Issuance
Borrowing from the global and regional credit markets via issuing bonds is one option 
available to Kuwait’s government to meet near-term budget shortfalls. Sovereign borrow-
ing simply involves a government issuing debt (selling bonds), receiving proceeds to cover 
expenses, and paying back investors the notional value of  the bond in addition to prede-
termined interest. The CBK is responsible for selling, purchasing and retiring government 
bonds. Currently, only local Kuwaiti banks can invest in CBK bonds.
Depending on government policy, a country usually issues a combination of  bonds, bills and 
notes to finance expenditures. The size and price of  the bond or bill depend on the country’s 
credit rating, as it provides a benchmark for other issuers of  debt. Sovereign creditworthiness 
depends on four main factors: the country’s economic strength, institutional strength, fiscal 
strength, and susceptibility to event risk. Lower than expected growth, geopolitical risk and 
the ability and willingness of  governments to progress planned structural reforms are shocks 
that may undermine a country’s credit rating. Generally, the greater the risk of  default, the 
higher the yield investors will require to invest in a given sovereign bond (i.e. borrowing costs 
become more expensive for governments as current and potential risks mount).
Aside from the aforementioned qualitative factors, certain quantitative ratios also govern 
ratings. These include but are not limited to the current account balance as a percentage 
of  GDP, government debt as a percentage of  GDP and the national loan to deposit ratio. 
Table 4 summarises Moody’s sovereign credit ratings for various countries along with the 
coupon each currently pays on a ten-year bond and the percentage of  gross debt/GDP (a 
measure for the financial leverage of  an economy).
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Table 4. Creditworthiness and Coupon Ratings
Sources: Moody’s ratings; IMF World Economic Outlook; Wall Street Journal. GCC member coupon rates and bond duration data 
were obtained from their Central Bank websites. 
 
Country  Credit Rating Gross Debt/
GDP
Current Account 
Balance/GDP
Coupon Rate Bond 
Duration 
Bahrain Baa2 76.12% 2.06% 5.50% 10 years
Kuwait Aa2 4.48% 32.13% 3.125% 10 years
Oman A1 11.03% -2.79% 4.50% 10 years
Qatar Aa2 13.92% 9.61% 9.75% 30 years
Saudi Arabia Aa3 2.08% 7.85% 5.50% 10 years
France Aa1 95.88% 0.013% 1.75% 10 years
Germany Aaa 60.45% 4.99% 1.00% 10 years
Greece Caa1 135.34% 1.07% 10.00% 10 years
Italy Baa2 125.62% -0.24% 3.75% 10 years
UK Aa1 84.90% -1.43% 2.75% 10 years
USA Aaa 103.70% -2.78% 2.25% 10 years
Surprisingly, on 30 March 2015, Al-Qabas in Kuwait reported that the law governing CBK 
borrowing via bond issues is no longer valid, as it was passed in the 1960s for a period of 
ten years. Henceforth, the government needs to issue a new law which regulates issuing 
sovereign bonds, especially if  it is interested in attracting regional or international buyers 
for such securities. The sooner the government acts, the more favourable the cost of  bor-
rowing will be – especially given the US Federal Reserve’s tightening of  interest rates 
(increasing rates) that took place in 2015, which could have negative relative implications 
for global credit markets.
One advantage of  issuing sovereign bonds would be an increase in the government’s 
financial transparency and reporting; more disclosure will decrease risk and the cost of 
borrowing. Another advantage is that sovereign debt should discipline the government 
and make it more forward-looking and fiscally responsible; any poor performance will 
indicate higher risk and result in higher borrowing costs that may block future access to 
markets.
Kuwaiti government bonds are currently offered only to domestic banks. If  the govern-
ment offered bonds to the public, one would expect higher demand by investors who 
have a lower appetite for risk. Investors who primarily invest in bonds could thus suppress 
liquidity and fund flows into the Kuwait Stock Exchange (KSE) and into the real estate 
market – one disadvantage of  a sovereign bond sale to the public. High demand for sover-
eign bonds by the domestic public could be exacerbated in the event that the government 
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simultaneously cut expenses by terminating expatriate contracts, for instance (driving 
down rents and demand for goods and services in the process). Another disadvantage 
could be depositor reactions to an alternative asset class – that is, Kuwaiti investors might 
find the rate of  return on bonds more desirable than those on the certificates of  deposits 
(CDs). As such, depositors might relocate their funds to bonds, which could eventually 
reduce the bank’s ability to lend, given current CBK reserve requirements.
Finding a New Optimal Level for Foreign Aid
Alesina and Dollar14 find evidence that the direction of  foreign aid is dictated by political 
and strategic considerations, rather than by the economic needs and policy performance 
of  the recipients. Bearce and Tirone15 argue that foreign aid can promote economic 
growth in recipient countries by facilitating economic reform, but only when the stra-
tegic benefits associated with providing aid are small for donor governments. When the 
strategic benefits are large, foreign aid becomes ineffective because Western governments 
cannot credibly enforce their conditions for economic reform. Kuwait has a reputation for 
giving large amounts of  foreign aid through at least five channels: foreign aid grants (fifth 
chapter), foreign aid grants and foreign loans (Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Develop-
ment, KFAED), multilateral agencies and oil products (KPC and its subsidiaries). Prior 
literature that measured Kuwait’s foreign aid used the AidData database, which accounts 
for aid provided by KFAED. In addition to the aid reported by KFAED, my research takes 
into account another channel of  aid provided by the MOF (fifth chapter).
Overall, Kuwait’s foreign aid reaches different parts of  the globe; however, it is fair to say 
that most of  it is political and directed to Arab countries. These are more likely to receive 
a higher amount of  aid from other Arab donor countries (namely Kuwait, Saudi Arabia 
and the United Arab Emirates).16 Further evidence is presented in Table 5, which provides 
information on the geographical allocation of  loans provided by KFAED since its estab-
lishment in 1961. As the table illustrates, Arab countries were by far the largest recipients 
of  loans (over 56 percent), which is not surprising given the mandate of  the fund.
14  Alberto Alesina and David Dollar, ‘Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?’, Journal of  Economic 
Growth 5/1 (2000), pp. 33–63.
15  David Bearce and Daniel Tirone, ‘Foreign Aid Effectiveness and the Strategic Goals of  Donor Gov-
ernments’, Journal of  Politics xl/3 (2010), pp. 837–51.
16  Eric Neumayer, ‘What Factors Determine the Allocation of  Aid by Arab Countries and Multilateral 
Agencies?’, Journal of  Development Studies xxxix/4 (2003), pp. 134–47.
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Table 5. Loans from KFAED, from 1961
Source: Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (KFAED). 
Region Total Loans (KD 000’s) Share (%)
Central Asia and Europe 305,774 5.61
Latin America and the Caribbean 167,120 3.07
East Asia, South Asia and the Pacific 992,952 18.22
Arab Countries 3,052,920 56.03
West Africa 534,489 9.81
Central and South-East Africa 395,874 7.26
Total 5,449,129 100.00
 
Werker17 explains the Gulf  countries inclination towards giving aid to other Arab coun-
tries: ‘No doubt the motivation for this was largely political: the Gulf  countries quell 
unrest due to the huge inequality among their coreligionists (between the oil haves and 
have-nots).’ Even though the author concludes that Gulf  aid is largely politically moti-
vated, he does not dismiss the possibility that it could contain a development component; 
but he argues that such a component is difficult to measure.
Ahmed and Werker18 argue that aid from Gulf  oil-producing countries to Muslim 
non-producing countries is correlated with the price of  oil. It picked up in the 1970s and 
slowed down in the 1980s, opening the door to civil wars and to the recent Arab Spring. 
The authors insinuate that Gulf  aid slowed the process of  democratisation in Muslim 
non-oil recipient countries; such a result could be perceived as a negative outcome of  the 
concentration and abundance of  Arab foreign aid.
Neumayer19 indicates that over the period 1974–94, Arab countries donated 1.5 percent 
of  their gross national product (GNP, currently known as gross national income or GNI) 
in foreign aid, which is above the 0.7 percent United Nations target. While this target is 
not a limit to foreign aid, it could nonetheless be an indicator of  the degree of  generos-
ity involved. Globally, the average amount of  foreign aid has rarely exceeded the UN 
target. According to the OECD Net Official Development Assistance (ODA) statistics, 
out of  45 countries that reported their Net ODA as a percentage of  GNI for 2000–14, 
the only seven which exceeded the UN target of  0.7 percent in at least one year were 
Denmark, Norway, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom and 
the United Arab Emirates (see Appendix C). Unfortunately, the OECD statistics do not 
17  Eric Werker, ‘The Political Economy of  Bilateral Foreign Aid’, Harvard Business School BGIE Unit Work-
ing Paper No. 13-026 (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School, 2012), p. 7.
18  Faisal Ahmed and Eric Werker, ‘Aid and the Rise and Fall of  Conflict in the Arab Muslim World’, 
Princeton University Working Papers (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 2013).
19  Neumayer, ‘What Factors Determine the Allocation of  Aid’.
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cover Kuwait, but from my calculations it can clearly be seen that Kuwait is considered 
generous. In three channels of  aid alone, over the period 2005–13 Kuwait exceeded the 
0.7 percent target in every year except 2006–7 (see Table 6).
Table 6. Foreign Aid, 2005–13 (KD)
Year Foreign Aid Foreign Loans Foreign Grants Total Foreign 
Aid
Foreign Aid/
GNI
2005–6 89,714,071 197,975,000 3,332,997 291,022,068 0.89%
2006–7 110,815,133 138,400,000 4,523,000 253,738,133 0.69%
2007–8 289,453,751 185,300,000 4,293,500 479,047,251 1.08%
2008–9 166,369,585 197,050,000 2,080,000 365,499,585 1.16%
2009–10 53,662,019 198,940,000 1,363,830 253,965,849 0.71%
2010–11 137,055,156 194,750,000 5,429,292 337,234,448 0.74%
2011–12 288,557,567 210,410,000 1,963,223 500,930,790 0.98%
2012–13 564,863,761 211,120,000 739,424 776,723,185 1.46%
Notes: Foreign aid data are provided by the MOF. Foreign loans and foreign grants data are provided by KFAED. GNI data are 
provided by the World Bank (average end-of-year values). Exchange rate conversions are CBK annual average $/KD rates. Please 
refer to Appendix D for exchange rates. 
 
As much as foreign aid is critical for the success of  national policy and security, research 
has documented that significant amounts of  it can have a negative impact on the govern-
ments of  the recipient countries. It is possible that Kuwait is currently giving too much, 
but to be able to tell this with certainty, the government must set performance measures 
for past loans/donations and determine the effectiveness of  the lending. It should also set 
priority and optimal future donation ranges that strike a balance between its foreign rela-
tionships and national fiscal needs. Further, the government should consider giving more 
loans and fewer grants, which would increase national revenue visibility and decrease its 
volatility. Cutting inefficient foreign direct aid could alleviate some pressure on Kuwait’s 
fiscal deficit.
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Reforming Subsidies
The government of  Kuwait subsidises electricity, water, gas, basic food products and 
Kuwaiti employee wages in the private sector, along with other items reported in Appen-
dix B.20 The total cost of  all subsidies was KD6.2 billion during the 2014/15 fiscal year, 
about 26 percent of  the budget. Fuel for power plants is the most heavily subsided item, 
costing the government KD2.7 billion or about 12 percent of  total budget expenditure. 
Privatising water and electricity assets is an option which should be given serious con-
sideration at this juncture in Kuwait’s finances, given that it moves the needle the most 
in terms of  savings. Another option would be to sell electricity, water and gas at market 
prices and give cash transfers to lower-income households to achieve equality. Removing 
subsidies should be addressed in more gradual ways (as opposed to outright immedi-
ate privatisation). Jiang, Ouyang and Huang21 analyse the possible impact of  removing 
energy subsidies on Chinese household income distribution under different scenarios and 
suggest that energy subsidy reform has the strongest progressive effect and a minimal 
impact on households.
In 2014, the Kuwaiti government announced a reduction in diesel subsidies. This resulted 
in an increase in the price of  diesel-dependent products and services. To mitigate price 
inflation and its negative effects on companies and citizens, the government could simulta-
neously introduce price controls (i.e. ceilings) to protect consumers from increasing prices 
of  goods and services. This might help lessen the impact of  a reduction in subsidies; how-
ever, it would negatively impact company margins, if  they failed to obtain efficiency gains 
elsewhere in their businesses.
Some believe that subsidies can redistribute resources and correct market failures. How-
ever, critics often warn of  the economic distortions created by subsidies beyond a certain 
threshold. Lucas22 examined global fuel subsidies, using World Bank data, and found that 
pricing fuels below cost is inefficient because it leads to overconsumption and that the total 
annual deadweight loss worldwide is $44 billion. Plante23 shows that fuel subsidies lead 
to crowding out non-oil consumption, inefficient inter-sectoral allocations of  labour, and 
other distortions in macroeconomic variables and reduction in aggregate welfare.
Reforming subsidies in Kuwait is a very challenging task for the government to implement 
given objections from the parliament. The MOF charged the professional services firm 
Ernst and Young with preparing a study about reforming subsidies, and the recommen-
20  Abbas Al-Mejren, ‘Impacts of  Fiscal Legal Setting and Institutions on Budget Outcomes in the Rent-
ier State of  Kuwait’, Economic Research Forum Working Paper No. 920 (Giza: Economic Research Forum, 
2015), Table 4, p. 39.
21  Zhujun Jiang, Xiaoling Ouyang and Guangxiao Huang, ‘The Distributional Impacts of  Removing 
Energy Subsidies in China’, China Economic Review 33 (2015), pp. 111–22.
22  Davis Lucas, ‘The Economic Cost of  Global Fuel Subsidies’, American Economic Review civ/5 (2014), 
pp. 581–5.
23  Michael Plante, ‘The Long-Run Macroeconomic Impacts of  Fuel Subsidies’, Journal of  Development 
Economics cvii/1 (2014), pp. 129–43.
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dations report was published by the press on 27 December 2015.24 The recommendations 
did not go down well with the parliament. MP Faris Al-Otaibi threatened to question Min-
ister of  Finance Anas Al-Saleh on subsidy reform. Also, on 12 January 2016, some MPs 
objected to the reforms and announced the following: ’Parliament members don’t want 
to touch people’s pockets [citizens’ disposable income] and affect their lifestyle negatively; 
therefore, we suggest that the parliament form a team of  MPs and relevant government 
officials to study subsidies reform and follow up with a report.’25 The cutting of  subsidies 
has thus been tabled since this time.
In summary, while subsidies may boost the welfare of  citizens by correcting market fail-
ure, they might also cause overconsumption and economic distortions. The government 
should study the impact of  Kuwait’s remaining subsidies on economic efficiency and 
choose an optimal level of  subsidy and cash transfer which maximises both citizen welfare 
and economic efficiency. In the Jiang et al.26 framework, starting with cutting the subsidies 
with the strongest progressive effect is recommended, on the assumption that the frame-
work holds for Kuwait; this assertion could be investigated in future work.
Introducing Taxation and Increasing Fees
Kuwait is currently a tax free country; imposing taxes could boost government revenues 
and help offset public expenditures. The government needs to remain cautious when 
introducing taxes, however, as the literature has documented a relationship between the 
structure of  taxes and economic growth as well as between taxes and inequalities.
Arnold27 conducted a study of  21 OECD countries over the period 1971–2004 to inves-
tigate the effects of  tax structure on economic growth. The results indicate that income 
taxes are generally associated with lower economic growth than taxes on consumption and 
property. The author then establishes a ranking of  tax instruments with respect to their 
relationship to economic growth. Property tax, particularly recurring taxes on immovable 
property, emerged as the most growth-friendly, followed by consumption tax and then by 
personal income tax. Corporate income taxes appear to have the most negative effect on 
GDP per capita.
24  Redha Al Sinary, ‘Surprises in Proposed Reform Recommendations: Reconsidering Housing Mort-
gage and Accommodation Allowance’, AlRai Newspaper, 27 December 2015. Available at http://www.
alraimedia.com/ar/article/economics/2015/12/27/645589/nr/kuwait (accessed 19 February 2016).
25  ‘A Team of  MPs and Ministers to Study Reforms’, Al Jarida Newspaper, 13 January 2016. Available at 
http://www.aljarida.com/news/index/2012793221 (accessed 19 February 2016).
26  Jiang et al., ‘Distributional Impacts’.
27  Jens Arnold, ‘Do Tax Structures Affect Aggregate Economic Growth?’, Quarterly Journal of  Economics 
106 (2012), pp. 407–23.
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Kuwait’s government recently announced new taxation plans.28 On 24 March 2015, the 
former minister of  commerce, Dr Abdulmohsen Al-Medeij, announced that the min-
istry had commissioned the IMF to work on a proposal for taxation to be imposed by 
2017. As noted above, Arnold finds that corporate income taxes appear to have the most 
negative effect on GDP per capita, and therefore it is recommended that Kuwait’s govern-
ment take into account the importance of  the tax structure hierarchy and its relationship 
with economic growth. In fact, on the same date as Al-Mudeaj’s statement, Saudi Arabia 
announced property taxes on ‘white lands’ (i.e. vacant land suitable for construction); the 
decision is in line with the Arnold recommendation. Because Kuwait is a small country 
(17,820 km2), mostly owned by KPC, starting with taxing property there might not be the 
best revenue-generating option.
In addition to highlighting the relationship between taxes and economic growth, the litera-
ture has also documented a relationship between taxes and inequality. 29 Through taxation, 
governments can alter the distribution of  income. In that regard, personal income tax and 
corporate tax are classified as progressive; that is, the tax rate increases when income 
increases. In contrast, consumption and real estate tax are considered regressive: expendi-
tures on goods/services subject to the tax represent a larger percentage for lower-income 
individuals than for higher-income individuals. Under a progressive taxation framework, 
given that everyone pays a different tax rate according to his or her income, progres-
sive taxes reduce income inequality (corporate tax effectiveness is subject to the mobility 
of  capital) but hurt economic growth, while regressive taxes do exactly the opposite. To 
find a balance between achieving economic growth and reducing income inequality, cash 
transfers may be considered. According to the IMF, direct income taxes and transfers have 
decreased inequality in advanced economies by an average of  one third. Note, however, 
that targeted social benefits do not always reduce inequality; benefits should be designed 
in a way which does not encourage withdrawal from the labour market.
Currently, fees and taxes on imports and foreign companies contribute 10 percent to 
Kuwait government revenues. In Dubai, fees currently represent 67 percent of  govern-
ment revenue; the emirate claims that the increase is due to economic expansion, as 
opposed to a hike in fees (i.e. volume over value). Saudi Arabia currently imposes a 20 
percent tax on income generated from companies owned by expatriates. Kuwait could 
study the impact of  such procedures and determine whether it makes sense to adopt sim-
ilar actions.
28  Redha AlSinary, ‘Surprises in Proposed Reform Recommendations; Reconsidering Housing Mort-
gage and Accommodation Allowance’, AlRai Newspaper, 27 December 2015. Available at http://www.
alraimedia.com/ar/article/economics/2015/12/27/645589/nr/kuwait (accessed 19 February 2016).
29  Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, Blanca Moreno-Dodson and Violeta Vulovic, ‘The Impact of  Tax and 
Expenditure Policies on Income Distribution: Evidence from a Large Panel of  Countries’, International 
Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series No. 12-30 (Atlanta, GA: Andrew Young School of  Policy Studies, 
Georgia State University, 2012). Leonel Muinelo-Gallo and Oriol Roca-Sagalés, ‘Joint Determinants 
of  Economic Growth, Income Inequality, and Fiscal Policies’, Economic Modelling 30 (2013), pp. 814–24.
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In summary, the government should conduct thorough research on the best tax structure 
to optimise both citizens’ welfare and fiscal balances. If  lessening inequality is a priority 
for the government, I recommend starting with imposing progressive taxes and specifi-
cally personal income tax, as corporate tax has a more negative impact on growth. On the 
other hand, if  fostering growth is a priority to the government, I recommend imposing a 
consumption tax, as the efficiency of  property tax in Kuwait is limited by the small area 
of  land. The government should also tax products and services that are not essential to its 
citizens and which cannot be bought easily in neighbouring tax-free GCC countries, or it 
should choose a low tax rate that does not negatively impact Kuwaiti companies’ profit-
ability. Failure on this front will be counterproductive, hurting local businesses, unless the 
GCC agrees on imposing a fixed consumption rate region-wide.
Devaluing the Kuwaiti Dinar
Monetary policy in Kuwait is the responsibility of  the CBK. The prime objective of  CBK 
policy is to maintain monetary stability, with the aim of  mitigating the impact of  inflation. 
Expatriate remittance outflow30 and the annual allocation to the FGF are two factors that 
help curb the level of  inflation. The CBK manages monetary policy in a manner which 
enhances social and economic progress and growth of  the national income. During the 
period from 1975 until the end of  2002, the CBK adopted a fixed but adjustable exchange 
rate policy, pegging the KD to a weighted basket of  major currencies which have signif-
icant trade and financial relations with Kuwait. Between January 2003 and May 2007, 
the KD was pegged to the US dollar. In 2007, the KD exchange rate was re-pegged to 
an undisclosed weighted basket of  international currencies of  Kuwait’s major trade and 
financial partner countries. The decision to abandon the dollar peg in 2007 was moti-
vated by the depreciation of  the dollar against other major currencies, and the potential 
impact of  increasing inflationary pressures from imported goods.31
Oil products comprise 90 percent of  Kuwait’s exports and are sold in US dollars rather 
than dinars. Devaluation of  the KD is one way by which the CBK could increase oil rev-
enues in local dinar terms. After the devaluation, one US dollar could buy more Kuwaiti 
dinars. This solution would create an immediate surge in oil revenues in local terms but 
would reduce the dinar’s value, its purchasing power and real wages. Devaluation could 
also cause inflation, as imports become more expensive.
Krugman and Taylor32 argue that the favourable short-run effect of  devaluation on the 
trade balance can come primarily through contraction (a slowdown of  an economy) 
30  Ali. Termos, George Naufal and Ismail Genc, ‘Remittance Outflows and Inflation: The Case of  the 
GCC Countries’, Economics Letters cxx/1 (2012), pp. 45–7.
31  Mohsin Khan, ‘The GCC Monetary Union: Choice of  Exchange Rate Regime’, Peterson Institute 
for International Economics Working Paper No. 09-1 (Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International 
Economics, 2009).
32  Paul Krugman and Lance Taylor, ‘Contractionary Effects of  Devaluation’, Journal of  International 
Economics 8 (1978), pp. 445–456.
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rather than substitution. In other words, devaluation not only reduces output and employ-
ment but also redistributes income from labour to capital. The authors conclude that 
devaluation is a costly cure, especially if  it is accompanied by an increase in taxes; in such 
a scenario the overall effect could be deflationary and might result in a steep decline in 
output. The authors recommend introducing devaluation together with demand-increas-
ing measures. Edwards33 showed that devaluations generate a small contractionary effect 
in the first year, while in the second year this effect is reversed, and in the long run deval-
uations are neutral.
In summary, devaluation seems to be the least favourable mitigating strategy because of 
its effect on imports and residents’ purchasing power. Kuwait’s government must be aware 
of  the risks of  devaluation. Nonetheless, this strategy could be worth the fiscal benefits it 
would bring if  implemented cautiously.
Restructuring Expatriates’ Benefits
Kuwait’s oil wealth has attracted large numbers of  expatriates who seize employment 
opportunities (both direct and ancillary) created by crude extraction. Expatriates increase 
the supply of  labour and provide different sets of  skills, thereby making the economy 
more efficient. Expatriates make up 69 percent of  the population and 83 percent of  the 
workforce, with most in the private sector. The majority of  expatriates working in the 
private sector are educated to below secondary level; those who are educated to above 
secondary level are a minority representing only a little over 8 percent of  the workforce 
(see Table 7).
Table 7. Percentage Distribution of Expatriot Labour Employment in the Private 
Sector by Education Level and Gender, as of 30 June 2014
Source: State of Kuwait Central Statistical Bureau 
Educational level Number Males (%) Females (%) Total (%)
 Illiterate 57,330 0.16 0.06 0.15
Under Secondary 443,791 41.74 29.62 40.69
 Secondary 119,096 15.62 22.11 16.19
Above Secondary 71,819 7.43 17.27 8.28
Not Stated  35.05 30.94 34.69
 Total 692,036 100.00 100.00 100.00
 
33  Sebastian Edwards, ‘Are Devaluations Contractionary?’, Review of  Economics and Statistics lxviii/3 
(1986), pp. 501–8.
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Very few expatriates are employed in the categories of  professional and technical workers. 
These skill sets represent 11 percent and 3 percent of  the workforce, respectively. The 
majority of  expatriates work in the services, manufacturing, agricultural or construction 
sectors (see Table 8). The professional and technical workers category includes scientists, 
engineers, architects, aircraft and ship officers, doctors, pharmacists, mathematicians, 
nurses, accountants, jurists, teachers and others.
Table 8. Numerical and Percentage Distribution of Expatriate Labour in the Private 
Sector for Males and Females by the Main Divisions of Occupation, as of 30 June 
2014
Source: State of Kuwait Central Statistical Bureau. 
Divisions Males  Females Total 
Number % Number % Number %
Professional and Technical 
Workers
123,556 9.68 30,450 25.28 154,006 11.03
Managers 37,131 5.77 4,283 3.55 41,414 2.97
Clerical Workers 73,579 10.20 18,657 15.49 92,236 6.60
Sales Workers 130,099 10.90 21,583 17.92 151,682 10.86
Services Workers 139,038 4.83 28,210 23.42 167,248 11.98
Agriculture, Animal  
Husbandry, Hunting and 
Fishing Workers
61,651 55.71 20 0.02 61,671 4.42
Production and Related  
Workers, Transport Equipment 
Operators and Labourers
710,914 100.00 17,256 14.32 728,170 52.14
 Total 1,275,968 100.00 120,459 100.00 1,396,427 100.00
According to the State of  Kuwait Central Statistics Bureau, the majority of  expatriates (43 
percent) earn a monthly salary ranging between KD60 and KD120, while 13 percent earn 
a salary above KD420; the remaining portion of  workers earn a salary ranging between 
KD120 and KD420, and 1.5 percent of  expatriates earn a salary below KD60. The edu-
cational level, type of  job and level of  salary all indicate that the majority of  expatriates are 
low-skill workers, which is a widely known characteristic of  Kuwait’s population.
Expatriates comprise the majority of  the population and the workforce in Kuwait, with 
the status of  temporary workers. Expatriates are not eligible for permanent residency or 
citizenship and cannot own real estate or corporations fully. Lacking such privileges, many 
expatriates typically depart before putting down roots that last more than a generation. 
Annually, expatriates transfer billions abroad. Kuwait, along with other GCC countries, 
often makes the list of  top ten countries in terms of  remittance outflows as a percent-
age of  the GDP, according to figures from the Migration and Remittances Factbook. 
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Between 2005 and 2013, remittance outflows in Kuwait ranged from $2.7 billion to $15.8 
billion and up to 11 percent of  GDP (see Table 9).
Table 9. Remittance Outflows, 2005–13 ($ million)
Source: Migrant Remittance Outflows and GDP Data were obtained from the World Bank. Remittance/GDP is based on author’s 
calculations.
Year Migrant Remittance 
Outflows
GDP Remittance/GDP (%)
2005 2,648 80,797.95 3.28
2006 3,183 101,558.97 3.13
2007 9,764 114,635.47 8.52
2008 10,323 147,380.28 7.00
2009 11,749 105,905.30 11.09
2010 12,126 115,416.40 10.51
2011 13,421 154,034.94 8.71
2012 15,874 174,044.70 9.12
2013 15,242 175,826.72 8.67
 
Not only do expatriates allocate funds away from Kuwait’s economy, they also pose a 
substantial drag on public resources. They currently enjoy many state benefits for no 
charge or at a subsidised rate. Doctors visits cost KD1 per visit, and water and energy 
are both subsidised. Many enjoy the benefits of  free education, public roads and other 
free infrastructure services. Offsetting these costs is difficult without income or consump-
tion tax systems. Expatriates also reduce the level of  consumption and investment in the 
GCC, thereby affecting economic activity. Alkhathlan documents a negative relationship 
between remittance outflows and economic growth in Saudi Arabia over the short term. 
This effect, however, fades over the long term.34
On the other side of  the equation, Kuwait, by comparison with other countries, has not 
fully captured the potential of  expatriates. Immigrant roles were vital for the development 
of  countries like Australia, Canada, the USA and the UK, as they create new businesses 
and new jobs, and contribute to taxes and to GDP. Using the USA as an example, a 1940–
2000 state panel shows that a 1 percentage point rise in the immigrant college graduate 
population increased patents by 9–18 percent.35 Another study shows that immigration 
has a positive effect on native wages of  about 0.6 percent.36 
34  Khalid Alkhathlan, ‘The Nexus between Remittance Outflows and Growth: A Study of  Saudi 
Arabia’, Economic Modelling 33 (2013), pp. 695–700.
35  Jennifer Hunt and Marjolaine Gauthier-Loiselle, ‘How Much Does Immigration Boost Innovation?’, 
American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics ii/2 (2010), pp. 31–56.
36  Gianmarco I. P. Ottaviano and Giovanni Peri, ‘Rethinking the Effects of  Immigration on Wages’, 
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In summary, nationalisation policy, immigration policy and the tax system in Kuwait 
should all be transformed in a manner which reduces the expatriate drag on public ben-
efits, captures the fruit of  immigration and fosters economic growth without hindering 
potential innovation. The government should provide better incentives and channels to 
allow expatriates who wish to work in Kuwait to contribute to its economy and to come 
with the intention of  staying. A longer-term, more autonomous visa/residency programme 
for higher-skilled workers and for economic contributors is a rational place to start.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have highlighted the current economic conditions in Kuwait and proposed 
a set of  relevant strategies for the government to consider. To alleviate the uncertainties of 
depending on oil, the government should establish reform goals with short-term and long-
term milestones; measuring and assessing performance are a must to ensure the efficiency 
of  reforms. Also, it is important that the government conducts thorough research to have 
a better understanding of  the economic, political and distributional costs of  associated 
reforms, helping it to determine when to propose each strategy and to what extent.
I believe that optimising the government’s capital structure is the most logical first step 
and thus I welcome the idea of  a prudent quantity of  sovereign debt while interest rates 
remain attractive. Any increase in regional instability, either via a deteriorating Saudi 
balance sheet, an escalation of  the conflict in Yemen or an increase in ISIS activity within 
GCC borders, would be likely to weigh on credit ratings and increase borrowing costs. 
Now is the time to obtain a reasonable price for borrowing. I also believe that Kuwait’s aid 
is an important component of  its philanthropic and political agenda. As such, I advocate 
not for a decrease in this activity but for its transformation. A portion of  grant-giving could 
be replaced with long-duration loans, which would serve as visible revenue sources for 
Kuwait and allow recipient nations time to use the funds effectively. This would not mean-
ingfully compromise Kuwait’s political or social objectives and would ease the burden of 
giving. Furthermore, I believe that Kuwait’s high-potential expatriates (i.e. entrepreneurs 
and job creators) should be more enfranchised through a longer-term visa system with 
more fiscal autonomy than currently exists.
The government should find mechanisms to curb subsidies in a manner which reduces 
overconsumption and fiscal imbalances while increasing social equality; I favour reform-
ing subsidies over introducing taxes, given the near-term logistical challenges of  a tax 
system. I do believe, however, that, in the medium term, taxation can be an effective tool 
in optimising economic output. While I heed the evidence of  property tax being the most 
effective form of  initial taxation, I acknowledge that Kuwait’s status as a city state with a 
small amount of  taxable property complicates the application of  that system. As such, I 
favour consumption taxes together with an item-specific cash payment system for poor or 
low-income households to counter the regressive nature of  this type of  taxation method. 
Journal of  the European Economic Association x/1 (2012), pp. 152–97.
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(Note that the USA has an item-specific cash payment system called Food Stamps). I also 
encourage consumption taxes in preference to corporate taxes, given the well-under-
stood and well-researched impact of  corporation tax on growth. Additionally, to make 
taxation more socially acceptable, I advocate introducing an initiative jointly, via a GCC-
wide agreement.
Kuwait’s challenges are thought-provoking and its reserves and wealth are substantial. 
Balancing the need to address the future of  both assets and liabilities should remain at 
the forefront of  government policy and action. Treatment of  Kuwait’s oil addiction must 
start now, while popular support can be cultivated and difficult decisions justified, such 
that a cure becomes a realistic goal in the not too distant future – a future which can still 
be influenced by present-day decisions.
32 Treating the Oil Addiction in Kuwait: Proposals for Economic Reform
Appendices
Appendix A. Breakdown of Fifth-Chapter Expenditure, 2013/14
Source: Ministry of Finance, Kuwait. 
Expenditure category Actual consumed ($)
A: General expenditures  
The Ruler of Kuwait Allowances 50,000,000.00
Ministry of Defence 1,141,167,728.53
Army reinforcement law 569,689.53
Conferences for government employees 70,844,310.91
Sports tournaments 49,075.27
Official missions abroad 49,580,622.25
Scholarships 204,655,525.07
Religious campaigns 1,461,247.08
Training 14,467,338.77
Employees’ accommodation 27,051,973.73
Judicial ruling expenditures 6,550,193.92
Judicial affairs 151,052,133.11
Total for category A 1,717,449,878.00
B: Internal transfers and subsidies  
Individuals’ transfer (humanitarian) 425,393,995.51
NGO subsidies 6,699,384.98
General subsidies 757,253,608.47
Transfers to public authorities and organisations (with separate budgets) 4,769,180,614.80
Special activities and companies’ compensation 175,089,528.94
Kuwaiti Nationals Working in the Private Sector Subsidy 458,175,999.30
Zakat 10,013,234.59
Total for category B 6,601,806,366.58
C: External transfer and aid  
Health expenditures for citizens and students abroad 151,223,886.42
The State of Kuwait annual subscription fees in international organisations 23,045,946.34
Foreign aid 412,965,270.33
Total for category C 587,235,103.09
Fifth-chapter total 8,906,491,347.84
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Appendix B. Total Subsidies, 2014/15
Source: Al-Mejren, Impacts of Fiscal Legal Setting, Table 4, p. 39.
Items in 2014/15 Budget Million KD Share (percent)
Funding fuel for power generation plants 2723.4 43.655
Funding refined oil products and liquefied gas 751.9 12.053
Support of national labour working in the private sector 554.7 8.892
Private universities students’ tuition, fees and rewards 480.9 7.709
Support of social care programmes 351.8 5.639
Abroad medical treatment 276.2 4.427
Allowance for reducing cost of living 242 3.879
Other subsidies 224.5 3.599
Rent compensations for citizens awaiting housing care 208 3.334
Disabled allowances 98.2 1.574
Cancellation of real estate loans 70.8 1.135
Interest on real estates’ loans 67.5 1.082
Central Bank of Kuwait (money market operations) 60 0.962
Support of sports clubs and other local activiites 56.9 0.912
Subsidy to fuel prices 30.7 0.492
Marriage grants 16 0.256
Funding fuels of Kuwait Airways 14.8 0.237
Support of labour unions and civil societies 5.1 0.082
Funding the House of Islamic Charity (Bait al-Zakat) 2.9 0.046
Support of local newspapers 1.5 0.008
Summer and Spring training 0.1 0.002
 Total 6238.4 100.00
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Appendix D. Exchange Rates (USD/KD) 
Fiscal year Exchange rate (US$1 = KD)
2003/4 0.2996
2004/25 0.2930
2005/6 0.2920
2006/7 0.2891
2007/8 0.2800
2008/9 0.2729
2009/10 0.2876
2010/11 0.2789
2011/12 0.2781
2012/13 0.2825
2013/14 0.2821
2014/15 0.2878
Note: Exchange rates were obtained from the Central Bank of Kuwait annual reports.
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Appendix E. Abbreviations and Acronyms 
BOT Build–Operate–Transfer
CBK Central Bank of Kuwait
CDs certificates of deposits
FGF Future Generations Fund
GCC Gulf Cooperation Council
GNI gross national income
GNP gross national product
GRF General Reserve Fund
IMF International Monetary Fund
KD Kuwaiti dinar
KFAED Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development
KIA Kuwait Investment Authority
KIO Kuwait Investment Office
KOC Kuwait Oil Company
KPC Kuwait Petroleum Corporation
KSE Kuwait Stock Exchange
MOF Ministry of Finance
ODA Official Development Assistance
OPEC Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
SMEs small and medium enterprises
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